WuITXX R TX1 q TIXXN VID!. 67 yard-have been assigned to the squadron. had barely survived a concerted attempt to This is regrettable since aviation--centered relegate them completely to the Re serves. 2 FID rests on the fundamental premise that The Desert One debacle in April 1980-the airpower plays a crucial role in meet ing the disastrous Iranian hostage rescue misthreat of foreign internal conflict. And airsion-simply underscored the extent to power means airplanes. Thus the fun damenwhich SOF had atrophied since the Viet nam tal question: If aviation FID is predi cated War. In the aftermath of that effort, the Deon the employment of airplanes and the 6 fense Department "halfheartedly" moved to SOS is not properly equipped in that regard, invigorate SOF-to include the creation of a whither aviation FID?
Joint Special Operations Agency in 1984.
The services were reluctant to relinquish control over SOF, however; they re garded Framing the Discussion this advisory body merely as an irritant and largely resisted its recommendations. Con-By the end of the 1970s, US spe cial operasequently, frustrated by Defense Department tions forces (SOF) were caput movtuum. 1 foot--dragging, and intent upon putting pur-Army special forces had been gut ted, Navy pose and power behind SOF revitalization, special warfare had fared little bet ter, and
Congress passed the Cohen--Nunn Amend-Air Force special operations forces (AF SOF) ment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986. The unquestionable design of this amendment was to force "revitalizawith the stand--up of Air Force Spe cial Option" of "SOF and SOF resources." 3 erations Command (AFSOC) in May 1990. Among the findings of Section 1453 of Albeit foreign internal defense was one of the Defense Authorization Act of 1986 was the five principal missions of SOF, criticism the conclusion that SOF "are the military emerged as early as 1990 that USSOCOM mainstay of the United States for the purwas more concerned with "raids, res cue, and poses of nation--building and training Rambo." 9 In January 1991 Nimed Toces Joutfriendly foreign forces." The straightforward naX International scolded the new com mand stated purpose of SOF involvement was to for "highlighting the Rambo or direct action preclude "deployment or combat involving side of special operations" while at the same the conventional or strategic forces of the time it praised the Marine Corps for "a bet -United States." 4 Such foreign advisory and ter understanding" of LIC. 10 Indeed, the training assistance ultimately fell within the only SOF component placing any emphasis purview of foreign internal defense, which on FID was Army special forces, although was subsequently delineated as one of th e Navy special warfare units were per ceived to five principal missions of American special have an inherent FID capability. The missoperations forces. 5 ing piece of the pie was aviation. Responding to the legislation, the Rea gan Thus, in March 1990, Gen James Lind say, administration promulgated National Secuthen commander in chief of USSOCOM rity Decision Directive (NSDD) 277, which (CINCSOC), validated the AFSOC--propose d outlined US strategy for low intensity conconcept of an aviation--centered FID ca paflict (LIC). The subsequent 1988 re port, enbility. Although acknowledging that FID is titled Natdonal Secudti Stiategy ot the UiAtn'e d "larger than just SOF," General Lind say went States, included an unclassified distillatio n on to state that "the focal point for or ganizaof NSDD 277. Among several salient fea-tion, doctrine development, training, and tures, it declared that LIC strategy would operational proponency . . . should be orseek to "strengthen friendly nations facing ganizations for which FID is a principal misinternal or external threats to their indesion-USSOCOM and AFSOC." 1 Armed pendence."' 6 with the CINC's go--ahead, AFSOC pro-Defense reform was the anodyne of 1986, ceeded to build a dedicated aviation--FID caand the Goldwater--Nichols Act was a sweeppability from the ground up, and in May ing piece of legislation mandating specific 1993 USSOCOM Directive 10--1 designated actions. For example, Section 211 broadened AFSOC as the "proponent" for aviation and strengthened the authority of combat-FID.1 2 The following year, in October 1994, ant commands. But more importantly for the 6th Special Operations Squadron be-SOF, Section 212 directed the "creation of a came the first Air Force SOF organizatio n unified combatant command for special op-dedicated to the FID mission area. erations." 7 As a result, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, signed by President Reagan in October 1986, cre ated United
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States Special Operations Command (USSO-Wafres and Av ia l A COM) under US public law. 8 Shortly after-Warfare and Aviation FID ward, the services created their own special John Keegan writes that "con tinuities, operations commands as components of USparticularly hidden continuities, form the SOCOM. The initial Air Force component principal subject of historical enquiry." It is was a numbered air force (Twenty--Third Air the "identification of links" between the Force) rather than a major command, but past and present which enables us to com-Air Force reticence was ultimately overcome prehend our actions in context. 13 In that light, the concept of aviation--centered FID nessed the emergence of special air warfare is not original: it is a response to the voi d as it is understood today. 15 created in SOF FID capabilities following For decades the United States had been the Vietnam War. Consequently, it is en-engaged in low--level or "small" wars, from tirely appropriate to reflect briefly upon the the Philippines at the turn of the century to history of "special air warfare" as it con trib-Nicaragua in the 1930s, but the end of the utes to the current concept of avia tion FID.
Second World War ushered in what has Special air warfare traces its roots to since become known as the "counterinsur-World War II, when the US Army Air Force gency era." Its genesis was the Truman Docsupported the Office of Strategic Services in trine of containment in 1947, upon which Europe and created the 1st Air Commando policy makers and military planners con-Group in Southeast Asia to support Gen structed ru dimentary counterinsurgency Orde C. Wingate's Chindit forces in Burma.
(COIN) doctrine for combating the commu-During the Korean War, aerial re supply and nist guerrillas in Greece. But COIN as a thecommunications wings conducted "long--ory, a strategy, and a doctrine came into its range infiltration/exfiltration missions, sup-own in the early 1960s in response to exply and resupply missions, [ at least one South Vietnamese Air Force so, Air Force planners concluded that its (VNAF) crew member was aboard each air-"extremely limited" COIN capability would craft.
necessarily have to be expanded. But interservice rivalry raised its all--too--In the spring of 1962 the Air Force expredictable head. According to Air Forc e panded its forces, and the 4400 CCTS atrecords, the Army's response to presidential tained group status on 20 March as the 1st insistence on elevating counterinsurgency to Air Commando Group-which was authora level equal to conventional warfare was an ized 792 personnel and 64 aircraft. In April attempt to take full responsibility for COIN.
the Special Air Warfare Center (S AWC) was In January 1962 the Army for warded a plan created at Hurlburt Field, and the 1st Air to McNamara in which primary responsibility Commando Group was subordinated to the for COIN in the host country was outlined SAWC. In October 1962 the Air Force submitas an Army role-ergo, the pri mary responsi-ted a program change proposal (PCP) to bility in the United States should similarly McNamara calling for "a six--squadron force be vested with the Army. Air Force Chief of of 184 aircraft and 2,167 primary element Staff Gen Curtis LeMay objected to this uni-personnel for fiscal year 1964. With this lateral assessment and insisted that air power end--strength, the Air Force could provide was a vital component of COIN. 24 However, one combat applications wing, one air comconcerned that the Army would pro vide its mando wing, and one corn posite squadron." own air support if the Air Force failed to do
The air commando wing would comprise three T--28 squadrons with 75 air craft, an tion was better suited for COIN. To buttress RB--26 squadron with 25 aircraft, and a its argument, the Army (not unlike the Ma -"combat cargo squadron" equipped with 12 rine Corps) argued that aviators should C--46, 12 C--4 7, and 14 U--1OB aircraft, all of identify with ground combat personnel and which would reside in the United States and that this identity was best achieved by being rotate to detachments overseas. The compos-a part of the same unit. The Air Force, not ite squadron, with eight T--28s, eight A--26s, surprisingly, maintained its doc trinal 12 C--46s, 12 C--47s, and six U--IODs, would position that aircraft should be centrally manbe permanently deployed to Pan ama. On tionalize the central theme of joint special operations. 29 After 1965 special air warfare be came an As the war unfolded, aging T--28s and A--adjunct to the conventional ground war i n 26s were soon replaced by A--lEs, and in late Vietnam, but elsewhere in the world-es pe-1964 a second squadron of A--lEs-the 602d cially in Latin America before 1965-spe cial Air Commando Squadron (Fighter)-de-air warfare units remained largely dedi cated ployed to South Vietnam. By 1967 the 14th to foreign advisory/training assistance. Air Commando Wing had been formed in "Early in its special air warfare planning, the South Vietnam, including five corn bat Air Force had recognized that pre vention or squadrons: two strike squadrons, two PSYOP defeat of subversion and insurgency called squadrons, and a helicopter squadron. 26 In for more than military operations but rather retrospect, the original mission of the 440 0 included civic actions as well." Gen eral Le-CCTS had consisted "primarily of pre paring May himself had concluded that doing civic small cadres for conducting-at the scene o f actions would improve "our prospects ... insurgency activity-the training of friendly for preventing or relieving the con ditions of foreign air forces in counterinsurgency op-unrest which could be exploited by insurerations" with the objective of developing a gent elements in conducting guerrilla opera-"self--sufficient VNAF that would allow the tions." 30 To that end, special air warfare withdrawal of US units." 2 7 But by 1965 the forces conducted combined operations to nature of the war had changed dramatically, inculcate in Latin American air forces th e and the special air warfare effort largely value of airpower in terms of transportation, shifted its focus to support of US conven-communications, preventive medi cine, tional ground operations. 28 weather operations, agricultural support, in-The rivalry between the Army and the Air sect and rodent control, and other eco-Force was a constant source of conflict, with nomic, political, and social services. As the Army maintaining that its organic avia-envisioned, these functions would "reduce the demand for expensive (and pres tige) tended conventional superpower hostilities weapon systems, promote internal security .
in Europe-nevertheless domi nates [Depart-. . and identify military forces with, not ment of Defense] thinking, train ing, and reagainst, the needs and aspirations of the source allocation." Kupperman insisted that people."31 By mid--1963, the Air Force had the US military establishment was therefore sent briefing, survey, or mobile training least prepared for the most likely teams to a dozen Latin American coun-threat-"those small but critical low-tries. 32 intensity conflicts proliferating at the pe-But as pointed out earlier, at the con clu-riphery of the great powers." Consequently, sion of the war in Vietnam the De fense De-to meet this more appropriate threat, the partment, stung by defeat, largely purged Defense Department would "re quire new itself of what had been laboriously created doctrine, organization, tactics, and equipfor COIN in the 1960s. 33 The subject was ment." 36 virtually eliminated from junior officer and The contention that the United States noncommissioned officer curricula by 1976, lacked the appropriate strategic policy, docand by 1981 the topic had all but dis ap-trine, and forces to conduct operations in peared from professional military edu ca-the third world became a prevailing theme tion. But among the lessons learned as a in professional literature through out the result of the American experience in Viet-late 1980s and early 1990s, leading even the nam, one with which military officers, poli-casual observer to draw obvious parallels to ticians, and the general public alike agreed the outlook of the Kennedy administration to, was "no more Vietnams." 34 Thus, fol-regarding the threat of revolutionary guerlowing the war, COIN disappeared as a de-rilla warfare. The difference, however, was scriptive label, to be replaced by "internal the unitary treatment of COIN, pro-defense and development" (IDAD) as a gen -insurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeperal term for the whole range of activities re-ing, counternarcotics operations, continlated to assisting less--developed countries; gency operations, and the like as subsets of "stability operations" became the appellalow intensity conflict. COIN had de facto, tion ascribed to specific operational activi-if not de jure, become subsumed to another ties. 35 construct. Thus, in the "LIC era," COIN In the end, the Vietnam War had instilled found expression as FID and IDAD. Foreign in the American public an almost visceral internal defense encompassed US efforts to resistance to protracted US military inter-assist a friend or ally facing an internal vention in foreign affairs-the much dis -threat; internal defense and development cussed "Vietnam syndrome." Nevertheless, included the array of activities pursued by a small cadre of academics and military the host government to ameliorate if not thinkers persisted in addressing the threat of eliminate the conditions which fostered disthird world conflict. With the inauguration content and precipitated the internal chalof Ronald Reagan as president and the ad-lenge to the government. vent of revolutionary insurgencies in Central America, these people found purchase for their doctrinal proposals as the national security bureaucracy began to pay attention tA\ a'r at iw•wed most to what was increasingly referred to as "low 'Jx'ng. intensity conflict."
In a seminal report prepared for th e Army's Training and Doctrine Command
The threat posed by LIC, combined with (TRADOC), Robert H. Kupperman declared the Desert One disaster, ultimately led to the that "the conflict least likely to occur-ex-creation of USSOCOM, with foreign inter-Sensing the potentially greatest obstacle nal defense as one of its five principal misto be US Army aviation objections, represensions. By 1991 the Joint Staff had begun tatives from AFSOC and USSOCOM met work on Joint Publication 3-07. 1, joint Tac-with representatives of the US Army Aviaitcs, Xech-iques an Vtoceduves [JTTP] tot tion Center (USAAVNC) regarding the ein Intemal Defense, and in 1992 the Air aviation--FID initiative. The meet ing con-Force produced its first--ever official FID cluded with mixed results; USAAVNC and doctrine in Air Force Manual 2--11, Nut Toyce TRADOC supported the fixed--wing portion OpertaAonaX Docine • ToTe'gn Intemal De-of the concept but expressed reservations tense Operations.37 For USSOCOM and AFabout any AFSOC rotary--wing FID ef-SOC then, the challenge was to avoid simply forts-especially given the perceived prosmaking appropriate genuflections to salient pects of overlap between USAAVNC and features of successful FID concepts and ut-AFSOC missions. tering the appropriate buzzwords while fail-Much of the reluctance had its roots in ing to step forward with dollars and Army and Air Force squabbles regarding resources. 38 helicopters in general. In May 1984 the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force announced an agree ment designed to improve Back to the Future cooperation between the services. Within the agreement were 31 initiatives designed Although the Air Force nominally continto reduce waste and facilitate im proved joint ued .to perform the FID mission after Vietoperations. Initiative 17 addressed the decinam, it was as an adjunct to its con ventional sion to transfer sole responsibility for mission and was accomplished on an ad hoc rotary--wing support of SOF to the Army. basis. In other words, extant resources were
The Air Force decision, however, had been tapped to perform FID activities. However, made without AFSOF input. In 1986, after several studies had conclusively documented two years of heated debate, the House Apthat "the lack of a sustained, coordinated ef-propriations Committee decided the exfort by individuals dedicated to the FID mispense of transfer outweighed any ad vantages sion is the principal reason we have failed to and directed that Initiative 17 not be im pleachieve the long--term changes in the way mented. With the stand--up of USSOCOM developing countries support, sustain, and in 1987, all SOF aviation assets fell within its employ airpower." 3 Recognizing this fact, the purview and for all intents and pur poses unfirst theater analysis performed by the Join t der a single "joint commander." Conse-Mission Analysis (JMA) organization of US-quently, in 1991 the CINC SOC Joint Special SOCOM identified an aviation--FID require-Operations Aviation Board Re port averred ment in US Southern Command that "Initiative 17 is no longer an issue."' 41 (USSOUTHCOM) for uniquely skilled per-Nevertheless, the residue of the Initiative 17 sonnel and for short takeoff and landing ca -battle could be detected at the meet ing bepable aircraft (Findings 025 and 026). 40 The tween AFSOC and USAAVNC and would underlying logic corroborated the conten-continue to color the debate for months to tion that a dedicated unit was better suited to come. 42 facilitating long--term solutions to seemingly In March 1991 the JMA quantified FID intractable airpower employment and susfixed--wing aircraft requirements, alluding tainment problems in the third world. As a to a "FID wing," and AFSOC submitted an result, per CINCSOC instruction, AFSOC updated mission need statement (MNS, the forwarded a statement of need (SON) to US -successor to SON) for a "family of Air Force, SOCOM for a dedicated aviation--FID or-FID--specific, aircraft." Subsequently, in ganization.
July 1991, HQ AFSOC published a concept study which became the keystone for future aviation assets only) bedeviled deliberations development of aviation FID. At the heart of regarding the initiative for months. the concept was the stated in tent to develop
The problem of aircraft proved most vexan organization of foreign--language--ing. The decision with respect to ownership trained, area--oriented, and culturally and of FID--specific aircraft would im pact the politically astute aviation experts to provide scope of the initiative in terms of ca pability, advisory and training support to for eign manning, basing, acquisition, funding, and aviation forces supporting the host gov ernso forth. The impact was detailed in a white ment's IDAD strategy. In November 1991 paper produced by HQ AFSOC/XPF-the lo-AFSOC and USSOCOM planners met to cus of aviation--FID concept developalign priorities in the near, me dium, and ment-in which sev eral options were long term. The JMA study not withstanding, outlined, ranging from no aircraft to a full-the USSOCOM/SO J--5 (Plans) in structed AFfledged flying squadron.
The least--SOC not to submit a program objective preferred option was no aircraft, considered memorandum (POM) for aircraft .43 a "workaround option," in which the unit In the near term (fis cal years [FY] would rely on "creative ventures" to accom-1991-1994), AFSOC would continue develplish its mission.
Citing demand for opment of the concept and would submit a aviation--FID capability from the vari ous POM request for a small "peo ple only" ortheater commands, the white pa per implied ganization. In the medium term (FY 94-96), that anything less than a full--fledged capa-AFSOC would stand up a dedicated organibility would effectively negate its usefulzation, independent of the plan ning cell in ness. 4 4 In short, aviation FID involves the the headquarters but reporting directly to application of airpower; without aircraft, the commanding general. Finally, in the the unit would be very limited in expertise long term (FY 96-98), the dedicated organioutside of certain nonrated specialties (e.g., zation would grow to include more personmaintenance). A unit with some aircraft nel and FID--specific aircraft.
(owned or leased) would possess greater aviator expertise but would still fall far short of its full potential. Thus, the po si-Intrusions tion of the FID planners was clear: for a SOF aviation organization with a FID mis-From the beginning, two issues dogged sion, aircraft were appropriate and nec esthe initiative to establish an aviation--sary. 45 The original study had concluded equipped organization dedicated to foreign that a "family of aircraft," representative of internal defense: the extent to which th e those found in the developing world, woul d unit would be "joint" and whether "owne d provide the means to develop FID--specific and operated" aircraft would be part of the tactics, techniques, and procedures as well equation. By this time, Gen eral Lindsay had as provide for qualification, currency, and been replaced by Gen Carl Stiner as CINCproficiency of aviation--FID aircrews. SOC. In 1991 General Stiner had di rected Moreover, assigned maintenance personthat the evolving aviation--FID unit be "joint," nel-FID trainers in their own right-would meaning that Army SOF personnel and asmaintain the aircraft as part of their own sets would be assigned in addition to AFSOC mission.
resources. Soon afterward, US Army Special
In December 1991 AFSOC prepared to Operations Command (USASOC) raised sevsubmit POM inputs to USSOCOM without eral pointed misgivings about dedicating aircraft, per the earlier direction of the scarce resources to aviation FID, and a host CINC's J--5. However, during a HQ AF SOC of questions (e.g., whether to in clude speprogram evaluation group meeting, the UScial forces or limit support to Army SOF SOCOM representative instructed AFSOC to reinstate aircraft in the POM sub mission. on how best to employ and sustain theirown Ironically, during subsequent POM de libera-air assets in support of their respective tions at USSOCOM, the entire aviation--FID internal defense and development (IDAD) initiative fell below the funding line. Gen-strategies-not to conduct operations for them. eral Stiner is alleged to have instructed his Nonetheless, appropriate aircraft are needed staff to fund the initiative, but under Gen-for our aviation--FID trainers to develop ard perfect the flying skills, tactics, ard eral Lindsay it remained below the fund ing techniques required in third workl line, and in the end AF SOC "bought back"
environments. Finally, in some limited the initiative. 46 instances, it may be advantageous to actual, In March 1992 the USSOCOM staff re-deploy AFSOC FID aircraft to demonstrate tle viewed the MNS for FID aircraft.
No t utility of airpower, for example, in support of surprisingly, there was a mixed re action. ground operations. The family of aircraft ve Within the J-3 (Operations), supporter s envision is certainly capable of demonstrating claimed the "capability would significantly this capability, and ideally a deployment of enhance FID operations in all theaters." this nature would be joint, with Army specil USASOC nonconcurred, cla g thea ther forces or Navy SEALs, etc., participating. As ,claiming that the our ground counterparts impart the skills MNS was inappropriate because "it appears needed for ground operations, our aviation-to describe a combat organization in sup-FID advisors would be working with the host port of a US FID mission that would de ploy air force, focussing on aviation employment these assets and perform the HN [host--and support. An adjunct goal, then, would be nation] mission."
Perhaps more to the to assist the host in developing a joint airpoint, USASOC maintained that "US SOCOM ground capability. As the host forces horne affordability for another major mobility their own skills, we could withdraw our program is doubtful." Moreover, the concept hardware and assist them to obtain their owi might prove "to be a very expensive pro-assets through available security assistance programs. Regardless, the ultimate objectihe gram which will compete with other un fiis to assist in developing the appropriate nanced mobility programs in US SOCOM." aviation capability within the existirg In short, aviation FID would compete with resources of the host government 48 USASOC programs such as the MH--47 helicopter. 47 Nevertheless, the Requirements Review Board at USSOCOM did not approve the new mission need statement when it wa s briefed on 4 February 1993. The aircraft ac-Since-1A913 aviation--2FD perTsonneX quisition line was therefore dropped out o f hawjv depluyed more than 7/5 times, the POM, but monies were moved to the opmostly to Latin Nmerica but mote erations and maintenance (O&M) line to facilitate a "non--material alternative"such as foreign air and ground forces during major aviation--FID unit soon enough to mee t exercises and unit deployments for training. emerging theater CINC requirements."
Shortly after pointing out this pat ently obvi-General Stiner went on to point out that a ous but previously overlooked fact, the Joint joint and combined "proof of concept" de-Staff requested a briefing to flesh out these ployment had been conducted earlier in the and other issues. year in Ecuador which he characterized as a USSOCOM briefers provided ad ditional "resounding success."
Finally, General details on 12 January 1993 to the vice direc -Stiner requested "help to obtain the retor of the Joint Staff (VDJS). Also in attenquired funds and man power billets needed dance was the former commander of to form the initial cadre and stand up the USA AVNC, who had sternly re sisted the inicomplete aviation--FID organization sooner tiative in 1991. His op position set the pace than currently resourced in the US SOCOM for the conduct of the briefing which, in the POM.1°5 0 end, was not a spectacular success. The General Stiner's letter was a watershed in VDJS, a Navy vice admiral, opined that by the evolution of the initiative. The Join t definition all special operations forces per-Staff subsequently determined that the "iniform the FID mission; therefore a dedicated tiative meets a valid theater requirement in unit was unnecessary. The briefers bravely USSOUTHCOM and is within the USSOattempted to describe the de facto compart -COM charter." Moreover, the Air Force conmentalization of SOF units by mission (i.e., sidered the aviation--FID organization "to be some are devoted almost exclusively to dicomplementary to its own programs, and rect action, others to counterterrorism, and supports the initiative." However, the Army so forth). In describing this aspect of SOF, "expressed concern that the rotary wing the briefers asserted that direct ac tion units portion of the organization may duplicate could only perform FID in the dis credited its own rotary wing" mission. Not surprisad hoc fashion of the past, and in performingly, the initial resistance of the USAAVNC ing the FID mission, direct action units remained intact.
would degrade their core mission. The VDJS The most important aspect of the Joint was not persuaded, and in closing he di-Staff review-one which would profoundly rected that the US SOCOM briefing be reaffect the character of the aviation--FID orvised and provided to the service deputy ganization-addressed the operational con-operations deputies (DepOpsDeps), to TRAcept. In an August 1992 letter, the Joint Staf f DOC, and to the USAAVNC. 5 
reviewers declared that
An amended briefing was prepared and the mission of the aviation FID organization presented to the DepOpsDeps in March in USCINCSOC's first paragraph is too 1993. The key concept of the revised briefrestrictive.
If the organization's primary ing-provided by AFSOC planners in remission is to upgrade the capabilities d sponse to the initial Joint Staff mus ings foreign air forces, then it can operate only regarding a special air operations unit with under the security assistance umbrella. If ifs a core FID mission-was the notional strucprimary mission is special air operations n turing of the proposed unit along the lines of Army special forces. Although this meeting was also chaired by the VDJS, the feedback was more promising. Contributing to this more positive response was the fact that The 6 SOS "is a combat addso`J TRADOC interposed no objections and the unit actiJate6 foy the purpose of current commander of the USAAVNC con-advising and tranming foveign sidered FID to be additive to his ba sic skills aviation units to emploN and training mission for foreign avia tors. Fi-sustain theiv own assets . . . into nally, the VDJS noted the popu larity of the Aoint, mult--natona a concept among the theater CINCs and the fact that the initiative was in line with defense planning guidance regarding the emerging post--cold--war security environ-Later in 1986 the exception was extended ment. 52 to US Navy special warfare, AFSOF, and other US Army SOF (i.e., PSYOP and civil affairs). The exception, ultimately codified in Title 10, noted that SOF may "train and train
The SOF Exception with" foreign forces using O&M funds. The The idea of Air Force FID operators being legislation also permitted "reasonable increakin to special forces transformed the entire mental expenses" to facilitate host coun try concept. The impetus for this sea change in forces' participation. In 1991 CINCSOC ofoutlook-from nominally a security assis-fered an amendment which further clarified tance organization to special air op erations the SOF exception. The amendment deleted focusing on FID-had its roots in what is the "minor and incidental" restriction, and known today as the "SOF exception." In allowed combatant commanders to pay for 1984 the Government Accounting Office rations, ammunition, transportation, and (GAO) audited military activities in Hondu-fuel costs incurred by foreign forces as a diras during Operation Ahuas Tara II. The rect result of training with US special operacomptroller general issued a formal opinion tions forces. The House and Senate to the effect that the Defense De partment conference committee accepted the amendhad violated fiscal law by using O&M mo -ment and directed the secretary of defense nies (Title 10) to conduct security assistance (SECDEF) to submit an annual report on the (Title 22) activities. Army special forces were use of O&M monies by SOF to train the the principal perpetrators, and 1st SO COM forces of friendly foreign countries. (the predecessor to USASOC) defended the Recognizing the SOF exception as the key activities as "own--force FID and UW to aviation FID, AFSOC planners turned to mission--essential tasks training" compris-the best possible model available-Army speing the mission--essential task list (METL). cial forces. For example, the mis sion state-The logic advanced was that it was proper to ment for the 3d Battalion, 7th Spe cial Forces use Title 10 funds for unit train ing overseas Group (3/7 SFG) states that the battalion in order to maintain special forces cor e "will plan, prepare for, and when directed, skills related to its wartime UW mission. In conduct special operations, primarily for-1986 a second comptroller general opinion eign internal defense (FID), in sup port of US recognized a "special forces exception," ac-objectives in the SOUTHCOM theater of opknowledging that the training of for eign erations." 53 In simple terms, 3/7 SFG is a forces was "minor and incidental" but none-SOF unit, capable of conducting all SOF theless critical to special forces war time missions but with a core mis sion of FID. The skills.
aviation--FID mission statement therefore became an unapologetic plagiarism of the 3/7 SFG mission statement: The aviation-military specialties common to all teams, FID unit would "plan, pre pare for, and when OADs would be formed from "flights" and directed, conduct special air operations, pritailored to the requirement. A no tional marily foreign internal defense, in support OAD might include pilots, other air crew, of US and theater CINC objectives [and de-maintenance, special tactics (coin bat control velop] and implement programs to advise, and pararescue), logistics, intelligence, and train, and assist foreign governments and other specialists. But if the re quirement were combatant commanders in the planning, maintenance specific, the OAD might conemployment, and support of air op erations tain only maintenance personnel. Neverthesupporting [host country] internal defense less, the CAD would provide an integrated, and development.'" 5 4 self--contained, "total package" approach to advising and training foreign air forces. And when three or more GAD--A teams deployed,
Special Forces with Wings
an OAD--B team would deploy as a C 3 1 headquarters. Finally, an OAD--C team would re -Based upon the Joint Staff re view and the main at home station to provide issues raised at the initial VDJS briefing, AF-connectivity. Tying all of this together, the SOC FID planners modeled aviation FID on
OADs would train to their mission--essential special forces, creating a combat advisory task lists. 55 unit activated for the purpose of serv ing the Since the mission was to assist for eign air theater CINCs' training and advisory re-forces with respect to the totality of airquirements in crisis, contingency, and war. power, the unit would comprise a diverse Consequently, within the parameters of the mix of specialties, including fighter, air lift, SOF exception, the unit would train in and helicopter pilots; other aircrew personpeacetime as it expected to operate in war.
nel (aerial gunners, flight engineers, etc.);
That is, the unit would advise, train, and as -maintenance personnel; logistics and intellisist foreign air forces in the employment gence specialists; special tactics people; and and sustainment of air operations. To acso forth. The unit would be organized in complish this goal, the unit would apply a flights with each oriented to specific thea-"total package approach," combining secuters-much like special forces groups-from rity assistance programs with unilateral, which the OADs would be organized, trained, joint, and combined deployments for train-and equipped. 56 ing. Moreover, the unit would provide Education and training became a key "adaptive training" in--country, meaning component of the concept. Aviation FID training beyond the basic instruction repersonnel would receive academic instrucceived by host--country forces at US institution and specialized training in a phased aptions such as USAF undergraduate pilot proach, concurrent with their duties. The training or at the Inter--American Air Forces basic phase would impart a fundamental Academy and the US Army School of the theoretical understanding of FID, including Americas.
instruction in revolutionary warfare, in-In that the mission of the unit would be tercultural communications, PSYO P, and resimilar to special forces, its organization lated areas. All personnel would be qualilargely came to mirror its mentor. The key fied in a foreign language appropriate to the became the operational aviation detachregional focus of their flight. Training ment (OAD), modeled on special forces opwould cover weapons, antiterrorism, combat erational detachments (OD). OAD--A teams survival, and high risk of capture, as well as would, in many respects, mimic OD--A technical training relevant to the re spective teams; however, OADs would be task organ -specialties. In the advanced phase, FID perized. Whereas OD--A's comprise specific sonnel would attend courses on joint SOF planning, air--ground operations, and the lignment directives, Det 7, SO COS was relike. Finally, in the professional developdesignated the 6th Special Operations Flight ment phase, select personnel would at tend (6 SOF) and realigned under the 16th Speprograms designed to broaden the theory cial Operations Wing (SOWV). At the same learned in the basic phase in order to make time, to provide continuity and "top cover," them politico--military professionals-rea FID office was retained in HQ AF SOC gardless of Air Force specialty-enablin g within the DO. these individuals to advise for eign air forces in the application of "airpower." The net result would be a SOF unit com prised of cul - and Programs (XP). In October 1991 a politico--military officer was assigned and an office created (HQ AFSOC/XPF). Follow-In June 1994 the aviation--FID concept ing the "buy--back" of the initiative in the was briefed to the secretary of de fense, and winter of 1992, HQ AFSOC/XPF expanded to following a meeting between the AF SOC eight personnel "out--of--hide "-that is, the commander, CINCSOC, and the SECDEF, the XP moved authorizations from other di vi-AFSOC commander decided to accelerate sions to XPF. In buying back the initiative, growth of 6 SOF to full--fledged squad ron AFSOC funded expansion of the core cadre status. Beyond the original core cadre of 2 0 to 20 personnel. Following a briefing to people, two flights would be added per year CINCSOC in July 1993, US SOCOM approved beginning in FY 95 until seven flights were growth to squadron strength-approximately fielded.
In light of this programmed 112 personnel-and funded the squadron in growth, HQ AFSOC requested approval to the USSOCOM POM.
Subsequently, in stand up 6 SOF as a squadron, which was August 1993, HQ AFSOC/XPF "broke out" of granted by HQ USAF. In October 1994 the the headquarters and became an operational flight was redesignated the 6th Special Opunit: Detachment 7, Special Operations erations Squadron (6 SOS) and became the Combat Operations Staff (Det 7, SO COS), first Air Force unit with FID as a core misreporting to the AFSOC director of opera-sion. tions (DO). Interestingly, this transitional
Since 1991 aviation--FID personnel have unit retained headquarters management deployed more than 75 times, mostly to functions concerning continued develop-Latin America but more recently to North ment of the aviation--FID initiative; there-Africa and the Middle East. 58 These deployfore, the METLs were a unique hy brid of ments have ranged from two--man OADs to operational tasks and headquarters managecomplex joint and combined SOF operations. ment tasks (e.g., doctrine development). In
The initial focus was in Latin America, owing April 1994, owing to Headquarters USAF reato SOUTHCOM's expressed requirements.
In fact, Ecuador was viewed as an early Operations Wing (Air Force Reserve). FAE "laboratory" for aviation FID.
Over a participants included fighters, helicopters, three--year relationship, AFSOC FID personnel airlifters of different sorts, coun terterrorism worked painstakingly to encourage the Ec ua-soldiers, air base security forces, and oth ers. doran air force (Fuerza Ae rea Ecuatoriana, or
The Ecuadoran army provided elements FAE) to commit to internal development as from a regular infantry brigade and a jungle well as internal defense. Aviation--FID advi-brigade. In addition to operational activisors therefore "brokered"-and accompanied ties, FID trainers assisted FAE main tenance as advisors-engineering and medical de-personnel in servicing their air craft. The ployments which built schools, hospitals, net result was a generation rate of over 80 and water treatment facilities and also pro-sorties in two weeks, a number the FAE norvided medical, dental, and veterinary serv-mally would produce over a 12--month periices to remote populations.
In eac h od. instance, the FAE was placed in the fore -
The joint and combined exercise was an front, projecting a positive government im-unqualified success and was briefed to age to villagers in areas threatened by CINCSOC in April 1994. Shortly afterward, narcotraffickers and guerrillas.
Beyond the Ecuadorans conducted an other counter-"civic actions," aviation--FID ad visors drug operation in the same area as before, worked with the FAE to improve their tacti-and again encountered Colombian narcal skills, particularly in air--to--ground op-coguerrillas. But on this occasion, employerations.
ing air and ground assets in a sophisticated The proof, as it is often remarked, is in joint operation, the Ecuadoran military the pudding. In the earlier "proof of con -forces routed the guerrillas and suffered no cept" deployment to Ecuador, it was learned casualties. The US military group comthat-owing to cultural factors as much as mander in Quito later char acterized the sucanything else-Ecuadoran army per sonnel cess of the operation as an out growth of the had never communicated by ra dio with FAE long--term training and advisory assistance pilots in the air. The predictable conse-provided by AFSOC FID deployments as well quence was disaster. In a counterdrug op-as of the exercise conducted the previous eration in an area on the Co lombian border March. known as the "iron triangle," Ecuadoran The Ecuadoran deployment-and similar army riverine forces encountered Colom-deployments to El Salvador, Venezuela, and bian guerrillas. The Ecuadorans suffered Tunisia-confirmed the early studies, which significant casualties. Ironically, FAE heli-maintained that "long--term benefits and copter gunships were only minutes away, continued joint/combined integration [are] but the troopers on the ground did not wholly dependent upon [a] sustained and know how to call for sup port or how to di-long--term relationship with host--country rect incoming aircraft even if they had been forces." 59 More importantly, the dedispatched.
ployments proved that aircraft are a critical Over a two--year period, AFSOC aviation--component. Inasmuch as the 6 SOS did not FID personnel worked with FAE rotary--wing own its own aircraft, it became necessary to and fixed--wing units in air--to--ground op-broker the participation of other units, erations in conjunction with 3/7 SFG OD--mostly from the Guard and Reserve. The A's working with Ecuadoran infantry units. amount and quality of the training provided In March 1994 a major exercise was con-to the FAE and other air forces was directly ducted in Ecuador, including three 6 SO F tied to having deployed US aircraft to dem-OADs, 3/7 SFG OD--A's, C--130s from the onstrate tactics, techniques, and pro cedures. 133d Airlift Wing (Air National Guard), an d For example, the FAE had never tactically an AC-130 gunship from the 919th Special employed their C-130s, so it became neces-sary to use the Air Guard C--130s to demon-the 5th Special Forces Group (5 SFG) and strate tactical airlift concepts bef ore turning the Jordanian Air Force. Forging links beloose the FAE pilots in their own aircraft. As tween the host Jordanian army and air force, had been maintained from the be ginning, and then with 5 SFG, the OAD advisors were the bottom line was fairly straightforward: able to orchestrate unprecedented Jordanian "A dedicated organization of technically air support to the combined ground forces. proficient aviation experts-with their own
The deployed 5 SFG battalion commander exaircraft-who are properly prepared . . . to tolled the value of the contribution of the 6 operate in a FID role, are (sic) imminently SOS advisors to the extent that he re quested better able to perform the FID mis sion than 6 SOS advisors accompany all of his fu ture the ad hoc practices of the past." 60 deployments. 62 On 1 August 1995 the 6 SOS published a strategic statement of the future entitled oth
SpeCaX Operations squadiron Concpts
The Future of Aviation FID Capabi\A'des. The document reflects that aviation FID continues to evolve to meet the and the 6 SOS new challenge of multilateral operations.
The 6th Special Operations Squad ron is The mission statement, revised and up dated, the realization of a vision articulated by a asserts that the 6 SOS "is a combat advisory handful of people at AFSOC and USSOCOM. unit activated for the purpose of advising Several have retired from active dut y, and and training foreign aviation units to em-only a tiny few remain who have been with ploy and sustain their own assets in both the initiative from its genesis. Nevertheless, peace and war and, when necessary, to inte-6 SOS is a concrete response to the chalgrate those assets into joint, multi--national lenges posed by the post--cold--war era. Naoperations." The document asserts that the tional military strategy is moving away from "squadron's wartime advisory mission supthe cold war imperative of containment to a ports theater combatant commanders in regional security orientation and to military three interrelated areas: foreign internal de -operations other than war. Military docfense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), trine and war--fighting doctrine are evolving and coalition support... through advisory to address regional threats world wide, with assistance delivered to foreign friends an d an emphasis on assistance to friends and alallies for both internal conflicts and re-lies to prevent conflict, maintain internal gional crisis or war." 61 stability, and pursue US security interests. Therefore the 6 SOS has in form and US support to the action programs taken by concept moved away from an exclusively another government to provide for internal FID focus to one encompassing an array of defense and development is what we mean activities subsumed within the construct by FID. Given the evolution of the security of "coalition support." Among several ac-environment to one of operations other than tions cited, this support includes fa cilitating war, it was a natural step for the 6 SOS to airspace deconfliction, integration of host evolve to a role in coalition support. aviation efforts into multinational air cam-Nevertheless, FID arguably remains the paign operations, improving the tactical core mission. performance of host aviation forces, and Policy guidance on foreign internal demaintaining vital links between host avia -fense is clear. Moreover, Congress has antion units and the joint force air com ponent swered the question of proponency by commander.
This latter capability was assigning FID to USSOCOM as one of its proved in the deployment of a 6 SOS OAD five SOF missions. And it is important to to Jordan during a major exercise in 1995.
note that during his introductory remarks at OAD advisors colocated with elements of a USSOCOM counterdrug conference, Gen cept as articulated. Therefore, as one Ai r Wayne Downing, then CINCSOC, asserted University research report con tended: that "SOCOM doesn't need more corn man-The time has passed for debating organization dos. We have enough commandos. What and development of a FID capability.We must we need are guys who can do FID. " 63 get to the business of creating forces that cai conduct these missions within the third world setting-where they must be sustained. There
Denouements is only one way to introduce mission capability and training credibility into
To their credit, successive AFSOC com-AFSOC's evolving FID program such that tIe manders have supported the FID initiative recipients will value our advice and assistance. as well as the contention that air craft are a X3SSOCOM must agtrsslveAy lund thepuychase. necessary component. But the corn mand . "o a Tami\A ot a'crtat... for the FID setting.
. (Emphasis added) Until USSOCOM acts, has run up against institutional, political, AFSOC lacks the means to maintah bureaucratic, and even parochial obstacles proficiency and credibility in aircraf that have diluted, if not doomed, an other -representative of those found in developing wise admirable effort to conduct aviation--nations. AFSOC awaits the aircraft that are centered foreign advisory operations as a ultimately necessary to fulfill its FID mission complement to the ground--based FID mis-responsibilities.6 5 sion performed by elements of Army spe cial As former US ambassador to the United forces.
Nations Jean Kirkpatrick once remarked, "I've The issue of aircraft remains prob lematic.
my own version of that old Pogo canard, At this writing, AFSOC FID planners have and [it] is, I have seen the problem and it is submitted a new mission need state ment for us. , _'e66 aircraft representative of those found in the developing world. 64 Although funding for leasing was provided in the POM, legal and bureaucratic obstacles tripped up the effort.
Postscript
But in truth, short--term leasing will serv e The 6 SOS suffered its first casualty in only as a Band--Aid and thus delay to future March 1996. Capt Mark T. Todd, a former in -AFSOC leaders the hard decision regarding structor pilot and F--16 pilot, was kille d owned and operated aircraft. It would be when the El Salvadoran 0--2 he was flying unthinkable to deny Army special forces or aboard as an observer crashed on a combat Navy SEALs the tools required to accomplish search and rescue training mission. Captain their mission, or to deny AFSOF direct--Todd personified the aviation--FID operator. action crews the platforms they need, or t o He had left the fighter communit y, fully prohibit training on these systems; yet this aware of the pitfalls of such a decision, beis the very position taken by many in the cause he believed in the FID mission. If US -SOF community with respect to aviation SOCOM and AFSOC step up to fully FID and the 6 SOS. This is remarkable given realizing the potential of the 6 SOS, it will the fact that a succession of CINCs and AF -be a fitting memorial to his vision, the vi-SOC commanders have validated the con-sion of those who went before him, and of those who will come after him.
ED
Notes 1. "Worthless residue." The Latin caput mottuum literally dieval alchemists, referring to the residue left after distillation means "death's head," or a skull. The term originated with me-was complete. Since then it has been used to refer to any worth- 
